The One-Sided US Narrative on Iran

In the preferred U.S. narratives, American leaders are always wise and rational but must deal with pigheaded and crazy adversaries. That is the way the current U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiations are presented inside Official Washington but there is a very different reality, as Gareth Porter explains.

By Gareth Porter

Talking to reporters last Monday, President Barack Obama asked rhetorically, “[D]oes Iran have the political will and desire to get a deal done?”  Iran “should be able to get to yes,” Obama said. “But we don’t know if that is going to happen. They have their hardliners, they have their politics.”

The idea that Iranian agreement to U.S. negotiating demands is being held back by “politics” is a familiar theme in U.S. public pronouncements on these negotiations. The only reason Iran has not accepted the deal offered by the United States, according to the standard official view, is that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is a hardliner who is constraining the more reasonable Iranian negotiating team from making the necessary compromises.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. (Iranian government photo)

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. (Iranian government photo)

But that is a self-serving understanding of the problem, and it reflects a much more profoundly distorted view of U.S. -Iran relations on the nuclear issue. The premise of Obama’s remark was that U.S. demands are purely rational and technical in nature, when nothing could be further from the truth.

The U.S. proposal on enrichment capacity is justified by the concept of “breakout,” which experts acknowledge is based on a completely implausible scenario. But Iran has now had a “breakout” capability meaning the capability to enrich enough uranium at weapons grade level for a single bomb – for six years. So the U.S. insistence on reducing its capability so that the breakout timeline is a few months longer clearly has nothing to do with denying a nuclear weapons capability.

But the official narrative clings to the idea that Iran is acting irrationally in refusing to accept that U.S. demand. The clearest illustrations of this warped U.S. understanding of the negotiations is a long essay last month by former U.S. proliferation official Robert Einhorn.

Analyzing the reason for the failure of the talks to date, he blames “deep divisions within the Iranian elite,” and specifically the position of the supreme leader. Einhorn cites a speech by Khamenei in Qom on Jan. 7, where he quotes Khamenei as concluding, “[B]y relying on the nation and domestic forces, we must act in such a way that even if the enemy does not lift the sanctions, no blow will be struck against the people’s progress.”

Einhorn suggests that Khamenei believes “Iran can live without an agreement,” implying that he is not really interested in an agreement. But a crucial point in the speech was Khamenei’s statement about U.S. intentions: “The Americans say with completely shamelessness, ‘Even if Iran makes compromises on the nuclear issue, sanctions will not be lifted altogether and at the same time.’” And Khamenei concludes, “This shows that the enemy cannot be trusted.”

Khamenei’s point was clearly not that he was any less interested in an agreement that achieved the end of sanctions, but that he was doubtful about the willingness of the Americans to do so. But in an effort to force the speech to fit the U.S. framework, Einhorn insists that it shows the Supreme Leader is “deeply skeptical of the value of an agreement.”

What is missing from Einhorn’s analysis – and from the American approach to negotiating with Iran in general – is any understanding that decades of aggressive U.S. policy toward Iran have forced the Iranian national security elite to think very hard about its strategy for negotiating with the United States to achieve Iran’s fundamental objective of getting the sanctions lifted.

Khamenei is not a simple-minded Ayatollah who likes the idea of going it alone, as Einhorn and others in the U.S. national security elite like to believe. He has been deeply involved in every major national security policy decision Iran has made from the beginning. He was Ayatollah Khomeini’s first representative to the Supreme National Security Council from 1980 to 1982, and was president of Iran from 1982 to 1990.

Khamenei has been criticized in the West and by his successor as President Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani for having refused to support negotiations with the United States either in 1989 and again after President Mohammad Khatami was elected in 1997. What critics of those policy decisions have failed to take into account, however, is that Iran would have been trying to negotiate with the United States from a woefully weak position in both cases.

In her 2005 book, Persian Mirrors, New York Times reporter Elaine Sciolino quotes then Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, whom the Americans have never dismissed as a wild-eyed Islamic radical, providing a remarkably revealing explanation for the Iranian calculation in rejecting negotiations with the United States at that point:

“Look at it this way. The United States has most of the cards. We discarded our rhetorical card when Khatami reached out and called for a dialog among civilizations. The United States discarded its rhetorical card when it abandoned its negative tone toward us. Now the United States wants to keep the rest of its cards but want us to discard all of ours. It wants to open a dialog while it still is keeping a number of sanctions against us. We’re saying, ‘You can’t keep all your cards. It’s not in our interest and it’s not in your interest.’”

Khamenei and Zarif both believed the United States was seeking to force Iran to accept an agreement on normalization under which Washington would continue to hold the sanctions over Iran’s head. The Iranian analysis further implied that it needed to accumulate more negotiating cards in order to have successful talks with the United States.

That was the point at which Iran’s nuclear program intersected with its strategy for negotiating with the United States. Iran was planning to build a uranium enrichment facility within a few years. The United States chose to interpret such a facility as evidence of a covert nuclear weapons program, but the evidence indicates that Khamenei and his advisers were actually counting on that enrichment program to provide it with stronger cards with which to negotiate with the United States.

Political scientist Jalil Roshandel, who worked on a research project for the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s think tank in 1997-1998, told me that influential figures he interviewed expressed the belief that having a uranium enrichment program would provide bargaining chips to be used in negotiating with the United States for the removal of the sanctions.

Roshandel, who now teaches at East Carolina State University, recalled that those who made that connection in conversations with him included an adviser to Ali Akbar Velayati, who had been foreign minister for 16 years, and then deputy Revolutionary Guards commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, who become chief commander in 1997.

Khamenei knows very well that this is the opportunity to play Iran’s nuclear cards in order to get the sanctions removed. But the United States appears to be using its sanctions card to force Iran to accept a reduction of roughly 75 percent in its enrichment capacity and not even offering to lift all sanctions in the short run even if Iran caves in.

The second problem is that Iran’s enrichment capabilities have taken on a new political significance in public opinion as symbols of Iranian technological advancement that limits how far they can go in dismantling it.

In the context of the history of the sanctions in U.S.-Iran relations, Iran’s determination to hold out for a better deal is hardly irrational. If the Obama administration fails to understand that fact the diplomatic stalemate is likely to continue.

Gareth Porter is an independent investigative journalist and historian writing on US national security policy.  His latest book, Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare, was published in February 2014. [This story originally appeared in Middle East Eye.]

3 comments for “The One-Sided US Narrative on Iran

  1. Susan
    February 16, 2015 at 10:05

    They won the case. Perhaps this is why even conservatives have just recently been suggesting that “Bibi” not come to the U.S. See:

    US Confirmed Existence of Israeli H-Bomb Program in 1987

    Report Raises Questions over US Refusal to Enforce Own Foreign Aid Laws

    by Grant Smith, February 14, 2015

  2. February 16, 2015 at 03:53

    One-sided indeed! Obama, what about Israel’s nuclear arsenal?

    A Washington-based think-tank, the Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRmep) recently painted a different, and more appealing, picture. A “special report” written by its director, Grant F. Smith, focused on a lawsuit that it has filed challenging “US ‘ambiguity’ towards Israel’s nuclear arsenal”.

    The highlight of this report, as pointed out by the think-tank’s director, is that “while it is difficult to deny that the ‘ambiguity’ muzzle has greatly benefited Israel and its US lobby, it is an ongoing costly disaster for American taxpayers”. According to a September Google Survey, he added, 64 per cent of Americans believe Israel has nuclear weapons, while six in 10 think US foreign aid to Israel is “too much”.

    He continued: “Yet, because it is official US policy to pretend the existence of Israel’s arsenal is unknown, a $3 billion-plus [Dh11 billion-plus] taxpayer giveaway of top-shelf American aid, cash and intelligence support is delivered annually, despite Israel [having] long possessed the ultimate deterrent.”

    The US has kept mum about this issue for several years. The late Lebanese-American White House correspondent Helen Thomas had failed to get Obama to admit that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. She had asked him early in 2009 at a White House press conference, “Do you know of any country in the Middle East that has nuclear weapons?” Obama’s laughable response was that he did not want to “speculate” on that subject.

    With the upcoming negotiations with Iran over its alleged nuclear arsenal, the Obama administration now has a golden opportunity to disclose these documents and at the same time pull the rug from under Benjamin Netanyahu’s feet during his planned, much-decried address — at home and in America — to the powerful US Congress.

    Read more:

    • Zachary Smith
      February 16, 2015 at 11:58

      It’s quite disgusting that the US has not only known about the Israeli bomb program, but has in many ways assisted it – while at the same time hyperventilating about the Iranian “potential” to maybe someday make a bomb.

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