Obama and Fast-Moving Global Crises

The three big international crises Ukraine/Russia, Israel/Gaza and Iran/nuclear mark a choice for President Obama, stick with Israel and the old alignments or shift toward more cooperation with Russia and Iran. But the pieces on this global chessboard are fast moving, says ex-CIA analyst Paul R. Pillar.

By Paul R. Pillar

In the face of intense, high-profile and especially fast-moving problems, the decision-making apparatus for foreign policy and national security has a narrow attention span. Limited policy bandwidth becomes even more of a problem than it normally is.

The weighing of relevant considerations is subjected to shortcuts. The most difficult problems tend to be viewed in isolation. Just getting through the day or the week without making such a problem even more difficult becomes de facto a national objective.

President Barack Obama and White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough. (This White House photo by Pete Souza was taken when McDonough was deputy national security adviser.)

President Barack Obama and White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough. (This White House photo by Pete Souza was taken when McDonough was deputy national security adviser.)

But even reasonably careful attention to each serious problem, considered more or less separately, is not good enough. Different problems need to be considered together. This does not mean the kind of ethereally broad, grandly synoptic approach that is the subject of so much armchair strategizing and kibitzing. It instead means a mid-range awareness of how the way we handle one current, concrete problem might affect the nature of some other current, concrete problem.

Right now the United States faces in particular three big, important, fast-moving challenges, each of them worthy of whatever front-page space they get.

One is the negotiation of an agreement, or likely extension of negotiations, on Iran’s nuclear program as the previously established target date for completion of an agreement arrives this weekend. The second is a new negative turn in U.S. relations with Russia, with the imposition of added sanctions against Russia, a situation that would have been a significant challenge even without the major added complication Thursday of the downing of a Malaysian airliner over the rebellious part of eastern Ukraine. The third is the expansion of Israel’s assault against the Gaza Strip, with the aerial bombardment that already had been ongoing being supplemented by a ground offensive.

Each of these three situations can complicate the other two. The most obvious candidate for complication concerns how the downturn in relations with Russia might affect the Iran negotiations. Some earlier worries about whether the Russians would continue to cooperate in its role as a member of the negotiating ensemble known as the P5+1 have not materialized.

As Alexei Arbatov’s excellent description of Russian interests in Iran points out, Russia does not want to see an Iranian nuclear weapon and in that respect does want to see an agreement that would be the best assurance against the advent of such a weapon. But the anti-Russian sanctions, and possibly any more severe damage to relations stemming from the airliner incident, have changed Moscow’s situation and its calculus enough that a continuation of previous Russian behavior cannot be taken for granted.

Russian responses can range from greater resistance to the stand that the United States might want to maintain regarding the permitted scale of Iranian uranium enrichment, to larger departures that might amount to Russia making its own separate deal with Iran. None of this need entail an abandonment of the Russian objectives of getting an agreement and not having an Iranian nuclear weapon; there are genuinely held differences of view even within the United States of what constitutes a good agreement and what is the best way to attain it.

The assault on Gaza crisis also can affect the Iranian negotiations, partly because the party conducting the assault also is the principal opponent of any agreement with Iran. Exactly what the effect will be is hard to determine, however. Given the contrived trade-offs that the Netanyahu government often sees in the balance sheet of its relationship with Washington, perhaps U.S. condoning of the assault will imply an understanding that the government of Israel should have that much less latitude in its efforts to sabotage an agreement with Iran.

But the effect easily could work the other way. Impunity in getting away with what is happening in Gaza may impart political headiness in Jerusalem and political momentum in Washington that would mean more, not less, Israeli sabotage of an Iran deal.

Whatever public distraction and political gain Netanyahu gets at home from the Gaza operation might make it easier for him to brush aside the voices in Israel who realize that an accord limiting Iran’s nuclear program would be in Israel’s interests and that sour relations with the administration in Washington are not.

An additional, ever-present factor is how the role of the United States as Israel’s principal defender and protector against international criticism or condemnation uses up U.S. political and diplomatic capital. The more that Israeli behavior is subject to such criticism, the more U.S. political and diplomatic capital is consumed. That means there is less of it left to spend on other purposes, including holding together a coalition, and holding it together on U.S. terms, in negotiating with Iran.

It also means less capital that might be needed to hold the Europeans together in a similar way in confronting Russia over Ukraine. This factor is likely to become increasing important to the extent that a continued Israeli operation in Gaza incurs moral repugnance among populations in European countries whose governments have not as yet clearly condemned the operation.

There are some symmetries among these three challenges, although not necessarily involving all three at once. The imposition of damaging sanctions on Russia is almost an open invitation for Moscow to become less cooperative regarding the damaging sanctions that have been imposed, under U.S. leadership, against Iran.

The death toll in Gaza, after the opening shots on Thursday of the Israeli ground offensive, stood at 246. Given the history of past Israeli attacks there, especially Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, it may take only a couple of more days for the number of dead to match the 298 who perished on the Malaysian airliner.

Paul R. Pillar, in his 28 years at the Central Intelligence Agency, rose to be one of the agency’s top analysts. He is now a visiting professor at Georgetown University for security studies. (This article first appeared as a blog post at The National Interest’s Web site. Reprinted with author’s permission.)

3 comments for “Obama and Fast-Moving Global Crises

  1. rexw
    July 20, 2014 at 06:24

    “…. stick with Israel and the old alignments or shift toward more cooperation with Russia and Iran.”

    No one knowing the subservience of the US Congress, owned by Israel, lock, stock and barrel, would consider for one minute that there will be any change from the current status quo. The direction is as per the Grand Plan, in place since the 1990’s.

    One also cannot believe that the US is not aware of the site from which the missile that knocked the airliner out of the sky was located. Let’s be honest and state that after receiving a Legion of Merit for the 1988 shooting down of the Iranian airliner and killing 290 people supervised by the captain of the USS Vincennes, the awareness of and preparation for just such an action would be uppermost in the minds of any US military man worth his salt. We all know that US bases pepper the globe…over 900, all well equipped for just such an emergency. As well, with the information known to the Ukrainian chocolate maker in embarrassingly triple quick time, this should cause enough doubts in the minds of those sceptics (those that do not read the Jewish media) as to the source of this new confrontation. And then to add another confusing ingredient, who would have wanted the attention of the world steered away from the inhumanities in Gaza but the psychotic Zionists, who with the mindset of “We own America” Netanyahu’s comment, feel quite safely that anything is up for grabs, and they have US missiles but the ton.

    So the likely direction that Obama and his feckless Congress (and Senate) will take will be determined by AIPAC, the default US government.

    Have no doubts about that.

  2. July 20, 2014 at 00:25

    Mr. Pillar,
    “…a choice for President Obama, stick with Israel and the old alignments or shift toward more cooperation with Russia and Iran.”

    Considering America doles out billions of dollars in aid and material and diplomatic support to Israel, doesn’t that give America some leverage over that little State that has been violating international law for 40 years ?

    You might not know it by the US MSM, but Israel is not winning any popularity contests overseas these days. Even a conniving lout like Bill Clinton timidly admits on India’s NDTV, “Israel is isolating itself’.

    British Parliament Accuses Israel of War Crimes

    Turkish PM Erdogan says Israel ‘surpasses Hitler in barbarism’

  3. July 19, 2014 at 11:44

    No one is buying the officail line. The fact of the matter is that the west is desperate in its attempt to regain its investments which are slowly being washed down the tiolet of insanity. Who are these investors, financiers? The three party, defense contractors, oil industry and banksters. All stand to make a fortune if war breaks out and if they can secure the assets of the Ukraine. Ask yourself, “What is in it for the ordinary people there and here?” Absolutely Nothing! Only the Ukrainian government could have diverted that flight to fly over the combat region. Why did it? Could Russia have diverted the plane, then through an impossible coordination of efforts, direct the pro Russian rebels, I prefer to call them the Ukrainian rebels, in shooting down the airliner which serves absolutely no strategic sense whatsoever. Further, how did Poroschenko know of the shootdown ten minutes after the event and how did he know the identity of the craft? Miraculous intelligence! Within hours, two hours, details of the site, pictures too, descriptions of dead bodies and plane parts were plastered everywhere, despite the fact the the west had no access, and still does not, to the site.

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