

MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND US STRATEGY

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Some of you may be wondering about the relevance of a paper on military psychological operations for a conference devoted to psychological strategies at the level of national and international behavior. The papers presented by Paul Smith, John Lenczowski, and others should have made you well aware of the Soviet threat in this regard. Steve Possony laid out very well for us the all-pervasive nature of the psychological dimension in his paper entitled "The PSYOP Totality." No matter which descriptive term we use for this dimension, the planned use of communication to influence attitudes or behavior should, if properly used, precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force.¹ Put another way, psychological operations is the one weapons system which has an important role to play in peacetime, throughout the spectrum of conflict, and during the aftermath of conflict.

Military psychological operations are an important

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part of the "PSYOP Totality," both in peace and war. This paper, therefore, addresses the state of US military psychological operations capabilities and the role that these capabilities play--or should play--in national strategy.² Let me state my thesis at the outset: while some progress has been made in recent years to enhance these capabilities, major changes are required, both within the Department of Defense and at the interagency level, to insure that the psychological operations resources available throughout the government are effectively organized and melded to support U.S. strategy.

Beginning at the top, there is no U.S. national level organization for PSYOP. We need a program of psychological operations as an integral part of our national security policies and programs.³ Psychological planning should be conducted on an integrated, worldwide basis, in response to national policy. Ad hoc committees created in reaction to regional crises are not the answer. The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide psychological operations strategy is badly needed. In addition, a knowledgeable psychological operations specialist should be added to the National Security Council staff, and play a key role in the interdepartmental committee created.

This coordinating mechanism should also provide to the Department of Defense the national policy upon which unified command PSYOP plans are based. Since strategic level PSYOP plans frequently require the assets of, or coordination with, other agencies, the lack of an interagency coordinating mechanism results in inefficient, time-consuming and incomplete coordination of theater PSYOP requirements and plans.

The present Administration appears to be cognizant of this perennial weakness in our PSYOP apparatus. The U.S. Information Agency, which has the principal responsibility for peacetime international communication, launched in 1981 an aggressive program named "Project Truth" to portray a more favorable image of the U.S. abroad, and to actively counter Soviet propaganda and disinformation. This new approach has not been without its detractors, however, to include some members of Congress; their concern in that "Project Truth" could take on too apparent a propaganda edge and end up destroying the credibility of the Voice of America and its parent agency, USIA.⁴ Under the leadership of Director Charles Z. Wick, USIA has also been more receptive to interagency cooperation, a welcome change to those who remember a much a more reticent attitude on this subject under previous administrations.

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Another major development was the Reagan Administration's announcement in the summer of 1982 that the President's national security strategy would have four basic components: diplomatic, economic, military and informational [emphasis added.]⁵ In his address to the British Parliament on June 8, 1982, President Reagan announced the intention of the United States to make a major effort to help "foster the infrastructure of democracy . . . which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." A second and related theme of the President's address was a call to engage more vigorously in a peaceful "competition of ideas and values" with the Soviet Union and its Allies.⁶ A \$65 million program entitled "Project Democracy" was announced in early 1983 to promote democratic institutions abroad. The program was intended to focus on leadership training; education; strengthening institutions such as labor unions, churches, political parties and the media; conveying ideas and information through radio stations like the Voice of America; and development of personal and institutional ties.⁷

To strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of communication activities, in early 1983 the President signed National Decision Document 77, on public diplomacy. The decision established an interagency Special

Planning Group (SPG) under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Membership consists of Secretary of State Schultz; Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Peter McPherson; and Charles Wick, Director of the US Information Agency. Four interagency standing committees have been established and will report regularly to the SPG: the International Information Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the USIA; the International Political Committee, chaired by a senior representative of the Department of State; the International Broadcasting Committee, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Public Affairs Committee, co-chaired by the Assistant to the President for Communications and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.⁸

The President's initiatives have not been received with open arms by Congress and the media. Secretary of State Schultz encountered considerable skepticism when he outlined "Project Democracy" to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations in February 1983. Doubts were expressed by several subcommittee members about the feasibility and propriety of the U.S. trying to train young leaders and foster the growth of such democratic institutions as labor unions, political parties, news

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outlets, businesses and universities in countries where democracy is not permitted. "The more we look at this thing, the more nervous I become over it," said Representative Joel Pritchard, Republican of Washington. "I don't see how this program can possibly do anything but get us into trouble," said Representative Peter H. Kostmayer, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who labelled Project Democracy as "basically a multimillion dollar American propaganda effort."⁹

In early March, Director of USIA Charles Wick encountered similar tough questioning at the hands of several skeptical members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Former Senator J.W. Fullbright made an eloquent plea to committee members that they not mingle the Administration's short-term propaganda efforts with long-term overseas programs such as student exchanges, which have a non-political tradition. Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, asked that Wick return to the Committee with proposed legislative guidelines for Project Democracy. "If you wish this program to survive, you had better establish some parameters for behavior. I can see what's going to happen before it starts--this is just going to be perceived as a propaganda tool," Dodd said.¹⁰ Indeed, most of the proposed 65 million dollar program for "Project Democracy" has been cut by Congress.¹¹

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This Congressional skepticism is vivid evidence of the obstacles which must be overcome for a Western democracy to wage effective psychological operations. Sensitive to this, the White House is concerned that its programs will be construed as a propaganda effort similar to campaigns waged by the Soviet Union; the President, for instance, has said it is "not propaganda--it's public relations."¹² Thus the jury is still out on the Reagan Administration's peacetime "public relations" program, and there is little evidence of centralized policy direction to the Defense Department that would enable it to more effectively plan for wartime strategic level PSYOP. One would also hope that overt and covert propaganda efforts are being carefully coordinated, despite the fact that there is no CIA representation on the Special Planning Group or its four interagency subcommittees. Nonetheless, the steps taken by the current Administration are hopeful signs of improved national level guidance and coordination of U.S. psychological efforts.

Within the Department of Defense, the picture of our PSYOP capability is not very encouraging. At the "supporting superstructure" level, our PSYOP expertise is minimal. There are few personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff (OJCS) with extensive PSYOP experience; those with the requisite experience are often burdened with other duties and thus

unable to devote their full energies to PSYOP matters. The same is true among the Service staffs in the Pentagon. The Army, with by far the bulk of forces and responsibilities dedicated to PSYOP, has at the present time only one fully qualified officer working full-time in this specialized area. Even this is an improvement--two years ago there were no PSYOP qualified officers on the Army Staff. The situation is no better at the unified and major commands. With the exception of the RDJTF (CENTCOM), few of these commands--which will direct the employment of military forces in their theaters during conflict--have trained full-time PSYOP staff personnel. Significantly, there are no general or flag officers with PSYOP experience in positions where this experience can be brought to bear most effectively. In sum, psychological operations efforts are fragmented and too frequently ineffectual largely because PSYOP expertise is isolated from those who require it and from the mechanisms required to effectively apply it to every level of command.

Among the military services, again our PSYOP capability is limited. The Navy has a radio and television production capability in its reserves which is very good, plus a few mobile radio transmitters. The Air Force has a National Guard squadron of specially fitted C-130 aircraft for support of psychological operations, as well as other

duties; it also has a handful of officers with PSYOP expertise, primarily as a result of having been instructors at the one-week familiarization course on PSYOP given at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida, and having served in PSYOP staff positions in unified commands or in the Pentagon. Only the Army has active duty forces dedicated solely to psychological operations.

The 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is what remains of the Army's active PSYOP capability after PSYOP units in Okinawa, Panama and Germany were disbanded following the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Today its missions and responsibilities are many and worldwide in nature. The Group provides support to all levels, from the unified command through the division. It provides support to both conventional forces and unconventional warfare forces. In addition, it is often called upon to provide support directly to national level agencies and organizations, to include the Department of Army Staff and the OJCS.

Essentially, military psychological operations consists of two broad activities: research and analysis and operations. The first activity consists of continuous monitoring and assessing of the psychological environment in specific foreign nations and how this environment affects

the formulation and execution of US policies and actions. This research and analysis results in the publication of studies and assessments that are unique within the interagency arena. These studies and assessments provide the foundation for the establishment of psychological objectives to support U.S. goals relative to foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis is therefore essential to accomplishment of the second broad activity, operations. This activity includes planning and executing of specific psychological operations campaigns which employ communications media and other techniques with the goal of causing selected foreign groups and individuals to behave in ways which support U.S. national and military objectives.

The lion's share of peacetime activities for a PSYOP unit, therefore, is spent on research and analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiences, developing PSYOP plans to support conventional and unconventional warfare units, and participating in field exercises which employ these plans. Because of the paucity of PSYOP expertise at unified commands, the 4th Group also provides staff assistance and advice to these headquarters, as well as to other major commands.

It should be eminently clear from the foregoing that one active duty PSYOP organization consisting of a Group

headquarters, a radio section and three battalions is wholly insufficient to support all unified command requirements in mid or high-intensity conflict. The reserves, therefore, are a vital component of the "PSYOP community"; fully 80 percent of the Army's PSYOP mobilization capability lies in its Reserve Component Units. The Reserve Component also provides some assistance in peacetime research and analysis support. Serving as the Army's Forces Command's (FORSCOM) planning agent under the CAPSTONE program (which links RC units with the units they would support mobilization), the 4th PSYOP Group coordinates the wartime planning efforts of RC units and provides training assistance.

Generally speaking, then, the active component 4th PSYOP Group acts as a "strategic nucleus" for the PSYOP community; it provides the bulk of peacetime research and analysis support, responds to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements, provides direction and guidance to the PSYOP community for wartime planning and peacetime exercise participation and provides the active component command and control nucleus for general or partial mobilization of reserve component forces. The Reserve Component assists in peacetime research and analysis efforts, performs its planning and training responsibilities under the CAPSTONE program, and prepares for general or partial mobilization in support of the unified commands.

One of the real success stories in the improvement of our PSYOP capability has been the unification of the Army "PSYOP community" under the aegis of the CAPSTONE Program. PSYOP supporting plans for unified commands have been developed, and subordinate level supporting plans are being completed. Every unit in the PSYOP community has a specific wartime mission, has established liaison with the units they will support upon mobilization, and in many instances have conducted field exercises with these supported units. These missions allow PSYOP units to focus on specific geographic regions, particularly essential for the Reserve Component because of their relatively limited time for developing campaign plans and conducting training; it also gives them a basis upon which to recruit linguists. Working closely together in these mission-oriented planning and training activities, this "PSYOP community" has achieved a sense of cohesion and camaraderie that could well serve as a model for the "Total Army" concept.

Paradoxically, the success achieved under the CAPSTONE Program underscores one of the PSYOP community's most glaring weaknesses: its capability to respond to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. As has been stated, for mid- and high-intensity conflict requirements, either partial or general mobilization of the Reserve Component is required. Conversely, the Active Component must be relied upon for almost all peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements--which

are increasing in scope, and which many observers feel will be the more likely threats to international stability during the 1980's. The most probable demands on PSYOP resources in this environment will be support to DOD and non-DOD agencies, staff assistance to unified commands, an increase in unscheduled studies and assessments oriented on crises-areas, and advisory Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) to Third-World nations. These demands, on top of the vital task of continuing to plan and train for mid- and high-intensity contingencies, will strain to the utmost the 4th PSYOP Group, which is already, in the words of a former Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, "the most over-committed and under-resourced colonel-level command in the Army."

Recognizing this dilemma, the Army in 1981 approved a program for a modest enhancement of both personnel and equipment needs of the 4th PSYOP Group, in addition to addressing some critical equipment requirements of the Reserve Component.

Implementation of this program, unfortunately, has become bogged down and little real improvement in overall capability has resulted to date.

While personnel resourcing and modernization of equipment are the most visible requirements to enhance the Army's PSYOP capability, these problems are only symptomatic of a larger issue, the lack of understanding and appreciation of PSYOP within the Army, and, indeed, throughout the military services.

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Some improvement has been seen in this critical area as a result of frequent briefings of senior commanders and staff officers by PSYOP personnel, the professionalism of PSYOP units in contingency planning and support of conventional units on field exercises, and the steady improvement in quality of PSYOP studies and assessments (the latter aided considerably by the increased hiring of high-quality civilian intelligence analysts). The enthusiastic acceptance of PSYOP planning and support by the high-priority RDJTF has had a positive influence throughout the Defense establishment; it has also served as a model for interagency coordination in a politically sensitive area that demands such cooperation. Within the Army, the change in staff proponency for PSYOP from the G5 (Civil-Military Operations) to the G3 (Operations) should encourage commanders and staff officers to integrate PSYOP as a weapons systems in their planning rather than being considered only as an afterthought, as has been the case so often in the past. Within the Air Force, a few dedicated officers are working on the formulation of PSYOP operational doctrine for their service.

The momentum of these improvements will not be sustained, however, unless steps are taken to institutionalize PSYOP in the appropriate field manuals and to teach this doctrine in our service school system. The Army's 10-week PSYOP Staff Officer's Course taught at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, reaches

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a very small audience, mostly foreign officers and U.S. personnel scheduled for assignment to the 4th PSYOP Group. Similarly, the Air Force's one-week course, although a valuable overview, reaches only a limited audience. As was the case before our Vietnam involvement, PSYOP instruction in our service school system--where our future commanders and staff officers are trained--is limited or nonexistent. Its absence not only makes the PSYOP community's job more difficult in educating supported units on the capabilities and limitations of this unique weapons system, it also quite naturally has a negative effect when priorities concerning equipment modernization and personnel resourcing are being set. Most conventional force officers are not consciously anti-PSYOP; they simply have never been exposed to its value and therefore tend to put more emphasis on those areas with which they are more familiar. For the same reasons, many quality officers shun assignments to key PSYOP staff positions in active duty units or on high-level staffs. This out-of-the-mainstream image can only be reversed if PSYOP is institutionalized as a permanent and valued member of our family of weapons systems, rather than one that is resurrected only when a crisis occurs.

Contributing to this lack of understanding and appreciation of PSYOP is its continued association with, and subordination to, the special operations command and staff structure. Inclusion of the 4th PSYOP Group in the Army's

recently formed 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) perpetuates and exacerbates this problem for the PSYOP community. The 1st SOCOM, using as its nucleus the former Headquarters, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, NC, has assigned to it all Special Forces units (to include those stationed overseas), the two Ranger battalions, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 4th PSYOP Group. Assignment of the 4th PSYOP Group to the 1st SOCOM will only further confuse those who previously believed PSYOP units to be part of Special Forces. The uninformed will perceive the 4th Group to be focused primarily in support of other special operations forces, when in fact the Group's missions and responsibilities are much broader.¹³

This confusion over PSYOP and other special operations roles and missions is not a new problem. Indeed, the "spiritual father" of special operations forces, William J. Donovan, initially envisaged the psychological dimension of warfare as his overarching organizational theme when he formed the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941:

Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing. The first stage would be 'intelligence penetration,' with the results processed by R&A [Research and Analysis], available for strategic planning and propaganda. Donovan called propaganda the 'arrow of initial penetration' and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an enemy. The next phase would be special operations, in the form of sabotage and subversion, followed by

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commando-like raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements. All of this represented the softening-up process, prior to invasion by friendly armed forces. Donovan's visionary dream was to unify these functions in support of conventional operations, thereby forging 'a new instrument of war.'¹⁴

Less than a year after COI's creation, it was dissolved but provided the nucleus for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); Donovan and OSS lost control of the overt propaganda function, however, which went to the newly created Office of War Information (OWI). The Army psychological warfare units that were formed during World War II primarily supported conventional ground forces, as was also the case during the Korean conflict.

There is a certain irony to this issue of PSYOP association with special operations when one considers the origins of the Army's Special Forces. With the impetus of the Korean War, the heightening cold war tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization in the Pentagon--the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). The first head of this organization was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, who was General Eisenhower's Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEP) and thus emerged from World War II as the Army's foremost expert in this new field.

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With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff with responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's status and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare; the inclusion of a Special Operations Division in OCPW and McClure's selection of the key personnel for that office gave officers like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Bank the opportunity to form plans for unconventional warfare and the creation of Special Forces. Despite a "hot war" in Korea, the primary influence behind the Army's interest in unconventional warfare was the desire for a guerrilla capability in Europe to help "retard" a Soviet invasion, should it occur. After some initial experimentation with the organizational machinery to conduct this "new concept" of warfare, the unit that emerged was clearly designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities, and it was based primarily on Donovan's OSS Operational Group Concepts--not those of the Rangers or Commandos. In order to provide the necessary training, materiel, and doctrinal support for both Special Forces and psychological warfare units, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OPCW" would be located. The Psychological Warfare Center, created in 1952 at Fort Bragg, NC, was that center--and it was there in the same year that

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the Army created its first formal unconventional warfare unit, the 10th Special Forces Group.

Roughly the same cold war tensions fueled interest in both psychological and unconventional warfare, but there was a crucial difference in the receptivity to each by the Army. Despite some of the "characters" associated with "sykewar," psychological warfare organizations gradually attained increased respectability in the Army during World War II and Korea. On the other hand, the Army continued to view unconventional warfare with a certain distaste. This reluctance to accept Special Forces resulted from the legacy of OSS--military rivalry during World War II, a lack of appreciation for unconventional warfare by officers trained for conventional war, and a continuing suspicion of elite forces by the Army, as well as from the fact that there was no formal precedent in the Army's history for Special Forces units. Most important of all were the constraints of manpower and money in what was, despite the cold war, a peacetime Army.

In the face of resistance, both within the Army and from the Air Force and CIA, Special Forces nonetheless became a reality through the support of General McClure and the persistent efforts of Colonel Volckmann and Colonel Bank. But the bargaining positioning of unconventional warfare advocates weak in 1951-52; those in OCPW who wanted a separate existence

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for Special Forces found it necessary to compromise. Because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and a tradition--and unconventional warfare had neither--it was expedient to bring Special Forces into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. This, plus the security restraints placed on the publicizing of Special Forces activities, explains the apparent ascendancy of psychological warfare over unconventional warfare at that time.

General McClure's rationale for combining these two activities within OCPW in 1951 and at the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 can be partially attributed to the heritage of General William Donovan's organizational philosophy, and to the fact that the other military services and the JCS had the same combination in their staffs. In allowing McClure his way, the Army may simply have found it convenient to lump these two relatively new out-of-the-mainstream (thus "unconventional") activities together while it attempted to sort out both ideas and weapons.

This marriage between psychological and unconventional warfare had its detractors, to be sure. Some psychological warfare officers believed that the kinds of background, education, training and experiences required for their field were inherently different from those necessary for the handling of special operations. Colonel Donald P. Hall, with

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psychological warfare experience in both World War II and Korea, expressed the view that there were few individuals who would have wide experience in both psychological and unconventional warfare. He feared that if the two fields were combined under one head, one of them "may suffer as a result of particular emphasis given to the function in which the controlling personnel are especially interested and experienced." This, of course, was part of the anxiety suffered by Special Forces adherents in 1952; at that time the "controlling personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychological Warfare Center, were those with psychological warfare backgrounds.¹⁵

Colonel Hall's fears were prophetic, but the roles have been reversed since 1952. The tendency indeed has been to combine these functions in a single staff element at every headquarters level, to include the Department of the Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified commands. Over the years, these staff elements have usually been headed by Special Forces officers, strongly oriented toward their field of expertise. In such an organizational environment, it has been difficult for even the most conscientious PSYOP staff officer to give his full attention to the broader responsibilities of psychological operations, rather than those oriented toward special operations.

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At Fort Bragg, the trend has been the same. The Psychological Warfare Center evolved into the Special Warfare Center in 1956, then the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance in 1969, and most recently, the 1st Special Operations Command. Through the years, key staff elements at the Center headquarters have invariably been headed by officers with Special Forces backgrounds.

An Air Force officer with long experience in PSYOP stated the problem for his service in 1977:

First the Air Force must put its own house in order by . . . removing PSYOP from the enigma of being grouped only under Special Operations, specifying the all-encompassing nature of PSYOP regarding all Air Force actions, and delineating responsibilities as applying to all forces. . . .16

The problem, therefore, is not simply one of misperception by personnel outside the special operations community; rather, it is that under the 1st Special Operations Command concept, the 4th PSYOP Group may tend over time to more narrowly focus its limited resources on special operations at the expense of its broader missions and responsibilities. This tendency should be vigorously resisted. Increased acceptance of PSYOP by the military services lies not with special operations as its primary focus; it lies in the recognition by military and civilian leaders of its value as a weapons system that can be

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used throughout the conflict spectrum, to include support of conventional forces.

A closely related issue is that of wartime command and control relationships of PSYOP units under the 1st SOCOM concept. Consolidating the diverse capabilities represented by Special Forces, Ranger, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units under one headquarters for peacetime management is one thing. It is quite another matter to propose that this headquarters - or a portion thereof - will deploy to a theater, report directly to its commander, and direct the activities of all special operations units during wartime. If the latter course is being seriously considered, some perplexing questions emerge:

- Are current command and control provisions for special operations forces--as outlined in unified command plans and supported by the Army's CAPSTONE program--deficient?

- What common thread links Special Forces, PSYOP, Civil Affairs and Rangers to justify the requirement for a separate wartime headquarters to direct these diverse capabilities?

- Does the 1st SOCOM headquarters represent another "layer" between the theater commander and the individual special operations capabilities? Have the costs vs. benefits of this been thoroughly considered?

- What size headquarters will be required for the Commander, 1st SOCOM, to prepare for simultaneous deployment to

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multiple, geographically distinct theaters, provide the command and control nucleus for special operations forces and maintain an adequate training and sustaining base in the U.S.? How will this affect his span of control?

These questions should be thoroughly examined as planning for employment of the embryonic 1st SOCOM continues, because the answers arrived at could have significant implications for the use of PSYOP. Current doctrine envisages a Theater PSYOP Command or Task Force reporting directly to the Theater (Unified) Commander, exercising control over all PSYOP units and agencies whose resources can be directed toward support of PSYOP--the goal being centralization of all PSYOP policy within one body to avoid duplication of effort, contradictory propaganda and propaganda contrary to national policy. PSYOP units, while considered "special operations forces," are combat support forces which must be prepared to simultaneously support both special operations and conventional missions. This distinction is important because over 90 percent of PSYOP units, both active and reserve, are assigned to support conventional forces; the remainder support special operations forces (primarily Special Forces units). Under current doctrine, Special Forces units operate under the control of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Command (JUWC) or task force (JUWTF). Thus, in the transition from peacetime to wartime, most of the PSYOP community aligns with a chain of command

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separate from other special operations forces. PSYOP units are employed at both strategic and tactical levels from theater to division, as a matter of routine; the other special operations forces are employed primarily as strategic assets on an exceptional basis.

While having the Ranger battalions under the command and control of the Commander, 1st SOCOM, might be rationalized (depending on how they are employed), it is difficult to envisage the conditions of employment for civil affairs units--particularly in high or mid-intensity conflict--that would justify placing them under the 1st SOCOM in wartime. PSYOP units may provide support to Civil Affairs during consolidation operations (those operations directed toward populations in either liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the liberating or occupying power), but the only time that Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP units might conceivably work together as a "package deal" is during some conditions of peacetime (MTTS) or low-intensity conflict.

Assuming that the 1st SOCOM is not designed solely for low intensity conflict threats, the insertion of this headquarters between the unified command and the disparate capabilities now embraced by the special operations label does not appear to offer many advantages. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to the close relationship that must exist between the senior PSYOP

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Commander and the Theater Commander in translating national policy to theater-level psychological operations objectives. Therefore, any such change in current doctrine and contingency plans needs to be carefully thought through and articulated, not only within the Army, but particularly to the Theater Commanders and their staffs.

All of this suggests that the time has come to consider a formal separation of PSYOP and special operations. As a prominent retired Army lieutenant general noted at the Special Operations Conference held at the National Defense University in March 1983, PSYOP is a phenomena in itself; it is so "all-pervasive" that marriage with Special Forces results in a case of mistaken identity which makes it so difficult for PSYOP units to carry out their doctrine and support other forces.

I believe that psychological operations are sufficiently important to warrant the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of this unique capability. This center should have both an operational component, and an educational, doctrinal and research and development component. The active duty operational component should initially consist of the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group. Educational, doctrinal, and research and development responsibilities and resources for psychological operations should be transferred from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (formerly the Institute for

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Military Assistance) at Fort Bragg, NC.

Ideally, such a center should be joint in nature, with representation from the other military services. It could include, for example, the personnel currently assigned to teach psychological operations at the Air Force's Special Operations School at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida. Also included should be representatives from those governmental agencies with responsibility for information and communication, such as the USIA. A variety of courses could thus be offered, tailored to fit the needs of PSYOP units, both active and reserve, and to train PSYOP staff officers for the services, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands. The center should serve as the intellectual foundation and clearinghouse for PSYOP research - both materiel and nonmateriel - doctrine, education, and operational techniques that would benefit all services and interested agencies.

To be fully effective, this separation of PSYOP and special operations should also occur at every major headquarters and staff level among the services, in the OJCS, in OSD, and in the unified commands. This is particularly important at the unified command, because usually the only PSYOP officer in this headquarters is located in the special operations staff element, thus detracting from his broader responsibilities of planning PSYOP support for the theater commander's total contingency requirements. The unified

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command provides one of those vital nodes, or bridges, between military PSYOP and U.S. national level policy and strategy. It is here that much of the detailed planning must occur between the PSYOP staff officer and representatives from other governmental agencies whose resources would be made available to the theater commander to assist in carrying out his psychological operations campaigns during wartime. This aspect of detailed contingency planning for the transition from peace to war requires a great deal more attention. Separation of PSYOP from special operations at the unified command would facilitate this task.

In summary, despite the encouraging efforts of the current Administration to enhance the informational and public diplomacy component of its national security strategy, there is still no effective standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide psychological operation strategy. Serious deficiencies exist in our military PSYOP capability; the program initiated within the Army in 1981 to enhance both the personnel and equipment needs of the 4th PSYOP Group should be pursued vigorously, for the likelihood of increased peacetime and low-intensity conflict demands on the active component is high during the 1980s. The CAPSTONE Program accomplishments of the PSYOP community should provide the foundation for continued planning and training for mid-and

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high-intensity conflict in support of the unified commands, but strenuous efforts need to be exerted to equip the reserve component with modern equipment. While improvements in the understanding and appreciation of PSYOP have been seen within the Army, this momentum will not be sustained until PSYOP is institutionalized in our doctrine and taught in the service school system.

Inclusion of the 4th PSYOP Group in the 1st SOCOM must not result in its further isolation from the rest of the Army and the unified commands and possible dilution of its ability to accomplish its broader missions; in particular the wartime command and control relationship of PSYOP units under the SOCOM concept requires thorough examination. Indeed, serious consideration should be given to the formal dissociation of psychological operations and special operations at every level within the Department of Defense. Creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of military psychological operations is needed to enhance the understanding and appreciation of this unique capability and to improve its effectiveness in support of U.S. strategy.

Overall, the changes suggested here should significantly enhance both the organization and the effectiveness of the total psychological operations resources available to the U.S. To do less is to ignore an important and cost-effective dimension of strategy.

FOOTNOTES

1. Stefan T. Possony, "The Invisible Hand of Strategy," Defense and Foreign Affairs (August 1975), p. 8. See also Samuel P. Huntington's discussion of "nonmilitary deterrence," pp. 14-21, in his chapter "The Renewal of Strategy," as part of Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982).
2. This paper is adapted from the author's "U.S. Psychological Operations Capabilities: An Assessment," presented at the Defense '83 Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 28 - 1 May 1983.
3. Raymond J. Barrett, "PSYOP: What is It? and What Should We do About It?," Military Review (March, 1972), pp. 57-72. Although written over 10 years ago, Barrett's article is a lucid analysis of the use of PSYOP at the national level.
4. "The Great Propaganda War," U.S. News and World Report, 11 Jan 1982, p. 29; "Voice of America Finds its Words are Weighed," The New York Times, 5 October 1981; "U.S. Sharpening Information Policy Overseas," The Washington Post, 10 November 1981, pp. A1, A10.
5. William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Address on National Security Strategy at The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 21 May 1982; Thomas C. Reed, National Security Council, Address to the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, 16 June 1982.
6. President Reagan, "Promoting Democracy and Peace," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 399, June 8, 1982.
7. "U.S. to Fund 'Democracy' Institutes," Washington Post, 21 January 1983; "Resist Urge to 'Go Public'," William Safire, New York Times, 24 January 1983, "U.S. Set to Promote Democracy Abroad," Washington Times, 8 February 1983; "Reagan; Let's Sell Freedom," UPI, 8 Feb 1983; "Diplomacy Funds Separate from Arms Effort, State Says," Washington Post, 9 February 1983.
8. National Security Council Fact Sheet, "Public Diplomacy," 8 February 1983.
9. "Skeptics Pelt Shultz with Queries on Reagan's 'Project Democracy'," Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times, 24 February

1983; "Lawmakers Voice Skepticism on U.S. 'Project Democracy'," Don Oberdorfer, The Washington Post, 24 February 1983.

10. "USIA Chief Questioned on 'Project Democracy'," Patrick E. Tyler, The Washington Post, 13 March 1983; "Promoting the Infrastructure of Democracy", with Charts, Mary McGrory, The Washington Post, 3 March 1983.

11. "Reagan's Drive to Win World Opinion," Jeff Trimble, US News and World Report, 1 Aug 1983.

12. "U.S. to Fund 'Democracy' Institutes," Lou Cannon, The Washington Post, 21 January 1983.

13. As an example of the media reporting that contributes to misunderstanding of PSYOP, consider the headings on the following newspaper accounts about creation of the 1st SOCOM: "Warsaw Pact Harassment: Military is Directed to Revitalize Behind-the-Lines Forces," The Washington Post, June 20, 1982, "Elite Green Berets Hope to Recapture Their Glory Days," Washington Post, 17 September 1982, "Army Establishes Green Beret Headquarters," Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 September 1982. This article stated the following concerning the role of PSYOP: "The command is expected to cover a number of Army units with expertise in special operations, including psychological warfare [emphasis added] and civic action with the Green Berets acting as the core," sources said; "Comeback Eyed for Green Beret," AP, Harrisburg Patriot, 16 September 1982; "Better Days for Green Berets?," editorial, Harrisburg Patriot, 18 September; "General for a Special Force," New York Times, 4 October 1982; "Return of America's Secret Warriors," U.S. News and World Report, 15 November 1982. In only two of these articles is PSYOP mentioned, with no explanation as to the broad nature of its responsibilities. Similarly, the July issue of Defense 83, a publication of the Department of Defense, contains a cover story devoted to special operations (with photos of Special Forces soldiers) which explains very little concerning the broad range of PSYOP responsibility (pp. 8-13); the same is apparent in an article by the CG, 1st Special Operations Command, entitled "Special Forces: To Help Others Help Themselves," (complete with photos of "Green Berets" in action), in the widely read October 1983 "Green Book" issue of Army (pp. 246-252).

14. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 6. Original source--Kermit Roosevelt, ed. War Report of the OSS (New York: Walker & Co., 1976), Volume 1, p. 16.

15. The documentation for this historical digression is provided in the author's U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (National Defense University Press, 1982).

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16. Fred W. Walker, "PSYOP is a Nasty Term--Too Bad," in Ron D. McLaurin, ed., Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 264.