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THE COUNSELOR  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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
December 8, 1981

TO: S/P - Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: C - Robert C. McFarlane *RCM*  
SUBJECT: Strategic Dialogue with Israel

On Sunday, December 20, 1981 I will be meeting with David Kimche in Jerusalem. At this meeting I would like to introduce two new topics to our agenda and for this purpose would appreciate your providing the necessary analysis and talking points.

Iran. Because of its historic ties to Iran and the large Jewish population still there, I believe that Israel has much to offer to our thinking on ways to influence change in that country. As a consequence, I would appreciate your development of a concept for our joint cooperation in measures to influence change in Tehran. I have no preconceived notion on the direction this cooperation might take.

3.3 (b) (1)



It seems to me that one area which may hold potential for the U.S. contribution to this effort is the Turkish connection. If you agree, could you provide your thoughts together with talking points for steps we might take to achieve cooperation through the GOT [redacted] in eastern Turkey. Needless to say, this is a sensitive matter and you should not coordinate its development with any other office.

The peace process. In my last meeting, David Kimche again stressed the GOI's interest in using this channel for surfacing any sensitive and private thoughts we might have on the peace process. In this regard, Jim Roche and Dennis Ross came away from their meetings in Jerusalem with several judgements on Israeli misperceptions of U.S. thinking on such key issues as settlements. If you believe it would be

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M08-113#54028  
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*Dennis*

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appropriate, could I ask you to develop these thoughts for my use with Kimche together with any others that come to mind. Again, this is a particularly sensitive matter which I would clear with the Secretary before using. You should not coordinate it with any other Bureau.

Could I ask you to provide analysis of the above points and talking points to my Assistant, Howard Teicher, by Noon on Monday, December 14, 1981.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 14, 1981

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MEMORANDUM

TO: C - Robert C. MacFarlane

FROM: S/P - Paul Wolfowitz

Talking points on Iran for Kimche Meeting (attached).

EXHIBIT

MOB-113 #54629

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5/27/11

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TALKING POINTS ON IRAN

-- THERE IS INTENSE CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF IRAN AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

-- BUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS CONCERN HAS BEEN LIMITED BY STRONG BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE AND BY THE SMALL INFLUENCE THE UNITED STATES HAS OVER EVENTS IN IRAN. IF FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES WERE ABLE TO SUGGEST PRACTICAL AND PRUDENT MEANS OF INFLUENCING EVENTS WITHIN IRAN, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT EVENTUALLY MOVE TO A MORE ACTIVE POLICY.

-- I AM ANXIOUS TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL ON HOW TO INFLUENCE THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND ON HOW TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. I FEEL THAT ISRAELI-U.S. COOPERATION COULD BE IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES.

-- WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY IS EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN, AND MIGHT BE HELPFUL WITH ENTERPRISES WE CAN IDENTIFY AS USEFUL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR IDEAS ON HOW TURKISH COOPERATION COULD BE EFFECTIVELY USED.

-- OF COURSE, FOR THIS DIALOGUE TO BE FRUITFUL IT MUST REMAIN RESTRICTED TO AN EXTRAORDINARILY SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE.


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-- WE SHOULD CONSIDER FIRST WHETHER WE CAN SET IN MOTION ANY METHODS OF INFLUENCING INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN.

-- SINCE NONE OF THE EXISTING EXILE MOVEMENTS HAVE MAJOR SUPPORT WITHIN IRAN, WE HAVE TO LOOK PRIMARILY AT OTHER INTERNAL MEANS FOR THE PRESENT.

-- IS THERE ANY WAY WE CAN DISCOURAGE SOVIET-BLOC PENETRATION OF THE IRP REGIME'S SECURITY AGENCIES? DO WE HAVE INFORMATION ON THIS QUESTION? DO WE HAVE ANY CHANNELS BY WHICH IT COULD BE SAFELY PASSED TO THOSE WHO WOULD ACT AGAINST PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS?

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
-- DO WE HAVE ANY WAY OF PROVIDING USEFUL RESOURCES TO THE MODERATE CLERGY WHO ARE NOW OUT OF POLITICS?

A SECOND IMPORTANT TOPIC FOR US IS PREPARING A STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR. SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS HERE ARE:

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-- IN A CIVIL WAR SITUATION, WHAT ARE THE CRUCIAL SKILLS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THE PRO-WESTERN ELEMENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO LACK?



-- IF IT SHOULD EVER BE USEFUL TO UNITE THE EXILE MOVEMENT, HOW DO YOU THINK IT COULD BEST BE DONE?

-- FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT THE WEST HAS SOME COUNTER TO SOVIET INTRODUCTION OF PARAMILITARY OR PROXY FORCES, WITHOUT NECESSARILY HAVING TO TURN TO U.S. FORCES -- SO THAT THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE AN OPTION WE CANNOT COUNTER.

-- WE ARE THUS INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHETHER ANY OF THE FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES (ESPECIALLY MUSLIM FRIENDS) HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND, IN A VERY GENERAL SENSE, THE WILLINGNESS TO PREPARE FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

Drafter: S/P:CHFairbanks:lm  
12/14/81 ext 28613

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