Turkish President Erdogan’s electoral victory opens new risks and some hopes for the region’s future, depending on whether an empowered Erdogan ratchets up his autocratic approach or chooses to ease up on his military adventurism and repression of the Kurds, as ex-CIA official Graham E. Fuller explains.
By Graham E. Fuller
Predictions among Turkey-watchers about the outcome of Turkey’s Nov. 1 elections were mostly wrong, including my own, as President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan managed to regain majority control of Parliament. Anxiety over potential political and social chaos played a significant role in voters’ decisions not to change leadership, particularly when no other party offered convincing leadership qualities (except possibly the new Kurdish party.)
The country is now left with a leader who over the past few years has distinguished himself by a list of negatives: his single-minded pursuit of executive power far in excess of constitutional provisions, his intimidation and harassment of political rivals, the muzzling of the media and the judiciary, and the tightening of the narrowing circle of often corrupt yes-men around him.
Turkish President Recep Erdogan.
In the eyes of many, the country would have been better served by a coalition government that could have delimited ErdoÄŸan’s often arbitrary, paranoid and erratic use of power. But the voters have spoken and supported him for a fourth time. Turkey now faces the uncertain consequences of continuing and controversial single-party (read ErdoÄŸan) rule.
Turkey faces many burning questions, but I’d like to focus here on the most central one, the overarching Kurdish question and its direct links to the fate of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey itself.
Turkey’s Syrian policy under ErdoÄŸan has done more to damage the country than any other issue.
While it was reasonable during the height of the Arab Spring to expect that Bashar al-Assad, too, might soon join the other fallen dictators, he proved remarkably resilient (and increasingly brutal) in crushing all opposition. We need to remember that Assad had been a virtual protege of ErdoÄŸan for over a decade, but when Assad rejected outright ErdoÄŸan’s fatherly advice to handle the early opposition in Syria with moderation ErdoÄŸan turned on him and decided to arm Assad’s enemies.
But as the main armed opposition to the regime fell increasingly into the hands of the more effective Islamic State (also known ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, the western anti-Assad coalition began to back off from further support to it, reasoning that even an Assad regime would be far less damaging (for nearly everyone) than a seizure of Damascus by jihadi forces.
ErdoÄŸan long resisted this analysis of the extremist threat and continued his dalliance with jihadi groups, until finally, reluctantly, yielding in part to western demands, and then suffering the worst terrorist attack in modern Turkish history in October led by an ISIS-led group in Ankara. Many argue that this terrorist outrage, in which Turkish security forces were strangely remote from the scene, actually helped shape the national mood of fear that facilitated ErdoÄŸan’s victory on Nov. 1.
But the grander issue of Kurds spills across the region. The international conflict surrounding ISIS rages in part around the Kurdish regions of northern Syria along the Turkish border, and contributed to reigniting the Kurdish armed struggle (PKK) within Turkey itself. ErdoÄŸan, who had made major strides in the past decade in working towards political reconciliation with the Kurds, finally reversed course and sought cynical political gain in allowing negotiations with the PKK to deteriorate. The result was a return over the past year or so to mutual armed confrontations with the PKK and a heightened fear among the electorate of growing domestic violence.
Blame for this serious deterioration and backsliding in the Kurdish issue, however, lies on both sides: the PKK too was ready to burnish its image through selected guerrilla operations against Turkish forces and officials. The PKK has particularly felt threatened by the successful emergence of a moderate left-of-center Kurdish party (HDP) in Turkey that offers a rival leadership to Turkey’s Kurds. In November the HDP gained a vital ten percent swing vote presence in Parliament, despite ErdoÄŸan’s major efforts to defame and suppress the party.
The upshot is that the Kurdish issue now represents probably the single most burning issue in both domestic and foreign policy of the country. Non-resolution of this issue is part of the cancer eating at the region in several of the following ways.
–Domestically, Turkish Kurds need to be better politically integrated into the country and their calls for greater political and cultural autonomy need to be acknowledged. Ankara may be uncomfortable with the process but failure to do so can only accelerate demands among Kurds for more radical solutions including potential outright separatism, something not now seriously on their agenda.
Having secured his political position for the next four years, will ErdoÄŸan now seek to tone down the harshness of his recent rhetoric and try to work with the various Kurdish elements inside and outside the country?
The Kurds even within Turkey are hardly a monolithic group. They are united in seeking to secure greater Kurdish rights within the country, but are physically scattered all over the country, Istanbul is the biggest Kurdish city in the world. They differ linguistically and disagree on political tactics.
Can Kurds unite behind the new moderate HDP and assist in bringing PKK operations inside Turkey to an end? Or will some Kurds value violence as a pressure point against Ankara?
–While ErdoÄŸan has sought to use any and all means to overthrow Assad, he rejected cooperation with the very effective leftist anti-ISIS Syrian Kurdish group, the PYD. Because the PYD is aligned with the PKK, ErdoÄŸan was shockingly even willing to throw the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani to the ISIS wolves last summer had it not been for U.S. intervention. Washington in fact admires the PYD, to Ankara’s consternation, as one of the most effective non-jihadi forces against ISIS.
–Some degree of political and cultural autonomy of Syrian Kurds in the north is essential to any future political structure in Syria. Ankara now resists that eventuality, but it is almost inevitable. At that point the Syrian Kurds would then join Turkish and Iraqi Kurds as working toward significant elements of local autonomy.
–The handwriting is now on the wall for Iran, the last of the four major Middle Eastern states with a large Kurdish population, possibly the second biggest Kurdish population in the region. Iran, a highly multiethnic country, will face mounting pressure from their own Kurdish population whose aspirations Tehran has quite failed to address, except through violence and repression and has shown far less flexibility than either Ankara or Baghdad now show.
Contacts between Iraqi and Iranian Kurds are intimate. Iran’s Kurds will increasingly affect Tehran’s dealings with its neighbors.
–The ongoing dilemma of the Kurds are emblematic of the overall failure of most Middle Eastern states to deal successfully with ethnic and religious minority populations. Handling of the Kurdish issue writ large is central to handling the broader conflicts of this region.
The Kurds have ended up gaining political ground in almost every one of the regional wars in the Middle East since 1990 in bringing the once obscure Kurdish issue into international prominence. The Kurdish profile in all regional countries continues to grow and is central to solutions to domestic Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian and, soon, Iranian problems.
Will ErdoÄŸan now continue to exploit Kurdish problems to strengthen his own hand? Or will he possibly “turn statesman” again, having now secured his political future for some years to come? His present operating style is not reassuring, but then politics can bring surprises.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in Pakistan. (Amazon, Kindle) grahamefuller.com
The Kurdish issue highlights the need for countries in the region to recognize each other borders and to work together to deal with the Kurds. The Kurds proved useful in weakening the nation of Iraq, note the US no fly zone over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds against the Iraqi government. The same thing is emerging in northern Syria and creates pressure not only on Syria but Turkey and Iran. The Kurds have pushed for “self-determination” since at least the end of World War I and probably before that as groups like the Armenians, Jews and Kurds pushed toward for separate identities from the nations of which they are part.
It’s a bad idea, recognizing rights of groups. Everyone should be sheltered by a Bill of Rights, but no groups rights should overwhelmed the rights of each single individual.
This article deserves a take down.
“Predictions among Turkey-watchers about the outcome of Turkey’s Nov. 1 elections were mostly wrong.â€
There is evidence that the predictions were right but the election results were wrong. The speed of the vote count and early victory declarations in the pro-government media alone should raise suspicions.
The nationalist MHP and the Kurdish HDP lost 2 million and 1 million votes, respectively. There were 1.3 million additional votes compared to June. 600 thousands were due to new votes (of which 200 thousands were new registered voters). There were also 700 thousands less invalid votes. More than half of the additional votes came from Istanbul, where the share of invalid votes shrank significantly.
The economist Erik Meyersson analyzed the election and found that the vote counts of AKP, MHP, and HDP show statistical abnormalities (Benford’s Law) which can be explained by some form of tampering.
http://erikmeyersson.com/2015/11/04/digit-tests-and-the-peculiar-election-dynamics-of-turkeys-november-elections/
“Erdogan’s often arbitrary, paranoid and erratic use of power.â€
Erdogan’s actions are neither arbitrary nor erratic, they are systematic and predictable. Maybe paranoia plays a role. Erdogan’s dream of the glorious restoration of the Ottoman empire coalesce nicely with the Salafi-jihadi objectives of turning the whole world (or at least as much of it as possible and viable) into an Islamic State run by Sharia law.
Ideologically speaking, there is no difference between Erdogan, IS (Islamic State), Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and other jihadi fighters. They are all driven by the same doctrine, based on a special Quranic interpretation, Islamic supremacy, and misogyny.
For Erdogan, the path to sharia at the moment is through the ballot box. “Democracy†he once said, “is like a streetcar. You ride it until you arrive at your destination and then you step off.â€
“…he [Assad] proved remarkably resilient (and increasingly brutal) in crushing all opposition.â€
The usual Assad bashing. Aren’t Western journalists getting tired of putting out this stuff all the time? Where is the evidence? I could fill pages with evidence about government restraint in handling the protests in Daraa even after unarmed policemen were shot dead by agitators from inside the protest crowd but as the author doesn’t provide any evidence I also don’t feel obliged to do so.
This is propaganda, not journalism!
“…when Assad rejected outright Erdogan’s fatherly advice to handle the early opposition in Syria with moderation Erdogan turned on him…â€
1,001 nights. Where did that originate? Al Jazeera, Daily Mail, Sun, Fox?
“…yielding in part to western demands, and then suffering the worst terrorist attack in modern Turkish history in October…â€
Erdogan didn’t suffer from the worst terrorist attack in modern Turkish history and he most likely enjoyed it because the 104 victims were either Kurds or labor union members, attending a peace rally. The MIT knew the perpetrators and monitored them but did nothing to prevent the crime. Same with the attack in Suruc. Both bombings could not have happened without acquiescence of the Turkish security apparatus. One of the Ankara suicide bombers was the brother of the Suruc bomber and the Turkish authorities knew both of them long before the atrocities happened.
“…the PKK too was ready to burnish its image through selected guerrilla operations against Turkish forces and officials.â€
The PKK was committed to the peace process but Erdogan took the Suruc bombing, which targeted Kurdish activists who wanted to help rebuilding Kobane, as pretext to start a crackdown on IS (Islamic State), which was not targeting IS at all but the PKK. The PKK acted against Turkish soldiers and policemen, after Turkish bombing raids in Iraq (in a clear violation of international law) had killed dozens of PKK members.
The PKK even declared a unilateral ceasefire on October 10, but this was rejected by Erdogan who continued the crackdown, including mass detentions of suspected sympathizers, marshal law, and curfews in majority Kurdish towns.
“The PKK has particularly felt threatened by the successful emergence of a moderate left-of-center Kurdish party…â€
Again, where does this come from? Who wrote this first? The HDP has to keep distance from the PKK because otherwise it would be outlawed. HDP co-leader Demirtas said, that that the HDP is neither a rival nor a partner of the PKK and has its separate agenda.
On a local level all Kurdish organizations cooperate. District mayor Hasan Basri Firat, a HDP member, was arrested for establishing a self-ruled court of the PKK. At lest 50 HDP members, led by Bitlis deputy Mizgin Irgat and Bitlis municipality co-chair Huseyin Olan, announced that they will serve as human shields to hinder Turkish anti-PKK operations.
Western propagandists always try to talk up divisions among Kurdish groups.
“Can Kurds unite behind the new moderate HDP and assist in bringing PKK operations inside Turkey to an end?â€
As written before, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on October 10 but has called it off on November 5 because Erdogan rejected it and the Turkish offensive continued unabated.
“Iran — a highly multiethnic country — will face mounting pressure from their own Kurdish population whose aspirations Tehran has quite failed to address, except through violence and repression and has shown far less flexibility than either Ankara or Baghdad now show.â€
Again, these are bold and uncommon assumptions. Iran has never employed the same level of brutality against Kurds as did Turkey or Iraq, though it has been implacably opposed to any suggestion of Kurdish separatism. Iranian Kurds are not interested in Kurdish statehood, because there are strong ethnolinguistical and cultural ties between Kurds and Persians. Especially Shia Kurds vigorously reject the idea of autonomy.
“Contacts between Iraqi and Iranian Kurds are intimate.â€
This is new to me and probably also to many other readers of this article. Iraqi Kurds have intimate contacts with Turkey, because just like IS (Islamic State) they sell their oil via Turkey. Masoud Barzani regards the Kurdish region as his fiefdom. The Simalka border crossing between Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan is on and off because Barzani’s KDP want to pressure the PYD.
At the moment all this doesn’t matter much, because Iraqi Kurdistan is in turmoil with violent protests in Sulaimaniyah, Qaladize, Gorran, and other cities. Several KDP offices went up in flames and at least four people died. Barzani’s presidency expired on Aug. 20, government employees have not been payed for month, the administration faces bankruptcy because of low oil prices and reduced payments from Bagdad.
How can a serious article miss such important details?
How can a serious article ignore the mountain of evidence which points to a substantial support of IS, Ahrar al Sham, Jabhat al Nusra, and friends by Turkey?
Turkey has supported Islamic terrorists with all needed materials, it has facilitated the selling of looted industrial equipment (mainly from Aleppo), antiquities, and oil by IS and other Islamists. Turkeys spy agency MIT has provided intelligence and logistical support to the terrorist groups.
MIT boss Hakan Fidan, Erdogan’s staunchest ally, in his own words: “IS is a reality and we have to accept that we cannot eradicate a well-organized and popular establishment such as the Islamic State; therefore I urge my Western colleagues to revise their mindset about Islamic political currents, put aside their cynical mentality and thwart Vladimir Putin’s plans to crush Syrian Islamist revolutionaries.â€
When MIT truck convoys with weapons for IS were intercepted by regional police, the involved officers, prosecutors, judges were removed from their posts and prosecuted.
Wounded Islamic fighters are treated in special wards of military hospitals, IS cells, coordinators, and recruiters are monitored but never hindered in their activities.
IS operatives are allowed to clear out Syrian opponents who fled to Turkey. The beheaded bodies of Ibrahim Abdul Qader and Fares Hamadi were just found in Sanliurfa, 55 kilometers from the Syrian border. Abu Mohammad was founder of RBSS (Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently), an activist group which regularly publishes information, photos, and videos about IS abuses in Raqqa, from arbitrary detentions and public executions too a ban on private Internet connections and the issuing of identity cards.
I could write pages about Turkeys involvement with terrorism and I will do this if the author of this piece starts a serious discussion and presents facts and sources.
I heartily agree. Don’t trust anything Graham Fuller has to say. He is CIA and associated with Zsarnayev’s uncle, the one that came out to say how Tamerlane was such a radical and was responsible for the Boston marathon “bombing”. Another masterpiece of media misinformation.
Don’t forget this gem:
“But as the main armed opposition to the regime fell increasingly into the hands of the more effective Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) and al-Qaeda affiliated groups, the western anti-Assad coalition began to back off from further support to it, reasoning that even an Assad regime would be far less damaging (for nearly everyone) than a seizure of Damascus by jihadi forces.”
I’d love to know when that supposedly was. All I see is the opposite.
Correct. I overlooked that. The jihadis get the most advanced BGM-71 TOW II now.
Thank you for posting so much information about the Kurds. They are an important force in a troubled region, yet so little known about their influence/ambitions.
I’m going to put on my tin-foil-hat and then do something I’ve howled about when the visiting authors here do it – say something ‘potentially’ pleasant about the Obama Administration.
Back in October the US airdropped 50 tons of weapons to “somebody” in northern Syria. If the destination had been ISIS, those weapons could have been loaded in trucks and driven across the border from Turkey. Next, there was the mysterious dispatch of the US Special Forces soldiers. They also went to the Kurdish regions. So what if they’re being used as human shield not against the Russians, but against the ambitions of the unbalanced Erdogan? Attacking the soldiers of a fellow NATO member would be mighty risky, and the US was quite public about the Special Forces. The handful of F-15c air-air fighters could be doing nothing more than keeping Turkish whining down. (protection against the evil Ruskies!)
Given his (BHO’s) track record, it’s probably a forlorn hope, but the slightest possibility Erdogan might be restrained brightens a cheerless day.
It seems that the weapons supply to the Democratic Forces of Syria (basically consisting of the YPG/YPJ with a few minor Arab militias as fig leaf) has stopped and the announcement of 50 US Special Forces was made only for domestic political purposes and is irrelevant, because there are already hundreds of Western operatives in Syria either as members of NGOs and aid agencies (USAID, White Helmets, Hands in Hand for Syria) or embedded with UN organizations and the Red Crescent.
The Christian militias (Syriac Military Council), who are at the moment trying to defend the Christian town Sadad against IS, are in desperate need of military supplies but until now their pleas have fallen on deaf ears. It is safe to assume that the Assyrians as well as the Kurds get more support from the Syrian army than from the USA.
The only sign that the USA doesn’t go along with Erdogan’s plans all the time was the removal of Patriot missiles. US policy is incoherent because the neocon hardliners play their own game, and they play it, if necessary, without President Obamas approval).